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1. Introduction: Fichtean Spirit and Letter
1 The example is well-known. Monsieur Jourdain – the main character in Molière’s comedy
Le Bourgeois gentilhomme – has an epiphany: under the tutelage of a master of philosophy
he suddenly becomes aware of the nature of his own language: 
Monsieur Jourdain: Par ma foi, il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose, sans
que j’en susse rien; et je vous suis le plus obligé du monde, de m’avoir appris cela. 
(By my faith! I have been speaking prose for forty years without being aware of it at
all; I am infinitely obliged to you for having taught me that.)1
2 Although  presented  as  comedy,  this  example nevertheless  highlights  an  important
philosophical  point:  the  difference  between merely  carrying  out  acts  (here  speaking
words) and having a conscious understanding of their laws and classification.  Johann
Gottlieb Fichte philosophically refers to the example of Monsieur Jourdain a number of
times in his works, including in the Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre.2 With his
writings on the difference between the letter and spirit in philosophy (Ueber Geist und
Buchstab in der Philosophie3), and his long and complex early 1795 essay on language: Von
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der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache4,  it would be hard to accuse Fichte of
being a philosopher who was unconscious or indifferent to the nature of his own written
and spoken language. 
3 Indeed, Fichte’s struggle for an appropriate philosophical language is often discussed in
his main published writings on the Wissenschaftslehre. In section §1 of Über den Begriff der
Wissenschaftslehre Fichte  claimed that  there  was  a  necessary  and universal  system of
philosophical  terminology that  must  be employed in accordance with transcendental
concepts, but that it could only be fully and accurately determined after the system had
been completed.5 While in the Preface to the first and principal presentation of his system
– the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/95 – Fichte wrote that he had
eschewed a fixed or set terminology both in order to stimulate independent cognitive
work in his students and to prevent the ossifying of his system. Moreover,  he would
continue  to  adhere  to  this  maxim  of  changing  his  technical  language  in  all  future
presentations of his philosophy.6 As Daniel Breazeale puts it in his article in the Cambridge
Companion to Fichte: 
“It was, in fact, Fichte’s deliberate and lifelong policy to adopt a new philosophical
vocabulary for virtually every new presentation of his system. His stated reason for
doing this was, first of all, to avoid giving comfort to those who might have thought
that they could ‘master the Wissenschaftslehre’ merely by memorizing a glossary of
technical terms.”7 
4 For  Fichte,  active  philosophical  thought  and  spirit  had  priority  over  the  letter  and
language,  with  the  latter  classified  as  the  outer  “designation”  (Bezeichnung)  or
“expression” (Ausdruck) of the inner cognitive activity: “Language, in the broadest sense of
the word, is the expression of our thought by means of arbitrary signs.”8 This is why when
trying to understand the Wissenschaftslehre it  is  imperative to move beyond the mere
letter of the text. 
5 However, because Fichte wrote numerous (originally unpublished) versions of his system,
certain commentators and readers have assumed that the letter was not important to
him. On the contrary, it was of the utmost importance, since the chief reasons behind this
multiplicity were to attain ever greater clarity of expression and to present one and the
same philosophy from fresh standpoints.9 In this regard, Fichte wrote in the preface to
the second edition of the Grundlage that he was thinking of publishing a new written
version of  the Wissenschaftslehre;  but  if  this  occurred,  the reader would not  find any
radical  departure  from  the  earlier  text,  but merely  “the  same  content  in  two  very
different forms and recognise it to be same again.”10 Nor should one draw the conclusion
from the multiple versions of the Wissenschaftslehre that the main published text of the
Grundlage itself was not clear, accurate or understandable enough, or even that it was now
obsolete.  In  Fichte’s  eyes,  the  text  was  still  valid  and crystal  clear:  “What  has  been
thought in a perfectly clear manner, is understandable; and I am conscious of having
conceived everything in a perfectly clear way.”11 
6 Finding the best philosophical expressions were therefore paramount to Fichte, because if
upon reading his work one already misunderstands the written letter, it will almost be
impossible to move onto its inner spirit.  In the fascinating but frequently overlooked
small published text from 1800, Aus einem Privatschreiben, Fichte elaborated on some of
the misunderstandings connected with his choice of philosophical language. He stated
that he instinctively chose terms that could convey the living and active intentions of his
philosophizing.  For  example,  German  words  ending  with  the  suffix  “-ung”,  such  as
The “Double Sense” of Fichte’s Philosophical Language. Some Critical Reflecti...
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 15 | 2017
2
Ordnung or Wirkung, were never to be understood statically in his writings, but dynamically
, because in his mind they always refer to activity – to the act of ordering or to the act of
effecting respectively: “I am so wedded to this way of expressing myself that when I begin
to philosophize in the manner that is natural to me no other meaning comes into my
thoughts at all”.12 
7 What about modern-day readers and scholars of  philosophy – to what extent are we
similar to Monsieur Jourdain with regard to Fichte’s philosophical language? Or do we
now have a better grasp of the flexible and dynamic qualities of his vocabulary, how and
why Fichte selected certain terms, not to mention the underlying concepts, ideas and acts
that his words are meant to express? In the last twenty years, great strides have been
made in the scholarship concerning Fichte’s philosophical terminology and thoughts on
language.13 Although the newly published Cambridge Companion to Fichte, edited by David
James and Gunter Zöller, does not have an individual text specifically devoted to Fichte’s
conception of language and philosophical terms, it nevertheless contains a number of
valuable insights directly related to these issues. Emiliano Acosta recently reviewed the
Cambridge Companion to Fichte for the Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte,  giving a general
overview of it.14 In the present review-essay I will critically focus on a few specific topics
in  the  volume,  particularly the  relationship between Fichte’s  language,  thought,  and
philosophical method. 
 
2. What is “Setzen” (Positing)? 
8 Fichte’s term “setzen” (posit) is surely one of the most ubiquitous and cited but least
understood notions in the whole of his philosophy. Paul Frank’s article “Fichte’s Position”
in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte is such an outstanding contribution to the literature
on the topic of positing because it explains Fichte’s nuanced employment of this term as
well as making a convincing case that its origins should be sought for in the Kantian and
logical philosophical traditions.15 Before turning to Paul Franks’s interpretation, I  will
first of all immanently examine Fichte’s understanding of setzen in his writings. 
9 What exactly does setzen mean for Fichte? In §1 of  his central  text the Grundlage der
gesammten Wissenschaftslehre of  1794/95,  Fichte sets out the aim of  his  philosophy:  to
discover the first principle of all human knowledge, one that does not enter into the
empirical  determinations  of  consciousness,  yet  still  lies  at  the  basis  of  it.16 His
argumentation begins by drawing a direct parallel between the certainty of positing in
logical thought and the principle of identity before moving onto an analysis of the nature
of the judgments carried out by the I (Ich).17 Here “setzen” or positing signifies a particular
type of philosophical judging and asserting. More exactly, in the opening sections of the
Grundlage it  concerns  a  rather  unique  act  of  theoretical  reflection  ( Reflexion)  and
abstraction  (Abstraktion).  For  readers  are  asked  to  begin  with  any  fact  of  empirical
consciousness, then to reflect on their own inner thought activity, continually stripping
away  anything  empirical,  leading  them  to  a  more  transparent  consciousness  of  the
structure of  human cognition.18 Eventually,  the reader learns to determine and posit
things  schlechthin –  that  is  to say,  absolutely,  or  without  any  further  grounds:  “one
attributes to oneself  the capacity to  posit  something absolutely.”19 This  will  include the
activity of one’s own I, or an awareness of what Fichte calls “the absolute I”. However, the
absolute I is not a thing or object, but pure activity: “The absolute I of the first principle is
not something; (it does not have a predicate, and cannot have any), it is absolutely, what it
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is, and it cannot be explained any further.”20 Accordingly, “setzen” in the early sections of
the Grundlage seems above all to relate to the self-aware, active and absolute form of
thinking (denken) and knowing carried out by the philosophizing I. 
10 However,  if  we  are  to  take  seriously  Fichte’s  own specific  statements  on  his  use  of
philosophical  language,  then  any  particular  sentence  or  proposition  of  the
Wissenschaftslehre can only be fully grasped to the extent that the reader has examined it
in its proper context and obtained an understanding of the Wissenschaftslehre as a totality:
“One explains by means of the context, and one should first acquire an overview of the
whole before trying to rigorously determine an individual  sentence.”21 A hallmark of
Fichte’s approach in the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre is that he repeatedly
stresses the crucial  interdependency between the part  and the whole:  “I  request  the
future judge of this text to proceed to the whole, and to view every single thought from
the vantage point of the whole.”22 
11 In other words, even though Fichte’s use of setzen is especially crucial in Part One of the
Grundlage, we should not neglect to examine the other parts of the text to see what else he
might have to say about this concept and term. There we see that in Part Two Fichte does
not simply consider setzen in connection with thinking and logical deductions, but also
directly  relates  it  to  anschauen (intuiting).  For  example:  “The  I  ( Ich)  posits  itself  as
intuiting, signifies to begin with: it posits itself in the intuition as active.”23 In Fichte’s
epistemology  the  conscious  volition  activity  of  the  I  may  be  immediately  grasped;
however, this cannot be done by means of discursive thought or concepts, but it requires
the faculty of intuition. In this respect it should not be forgotten that in the preface to the
Grundlage Fichte maintains that his entire system of philosophy ultimately rests on a free
Tathandlung or act of the I – and this free act must be comprehended by means of the
“faculty  of  inner  intuition.”24 In  a  later  published  text  Fichte  would  write  that  the
grounding of his theory of knowledge on the primacy of intuition (Anschauung) instead of
on concepts is a sign of his attempt to progress beyond Kant’s epistemology.25 
12 Accordingly, I would argue that in the Grundlage the term “setzen” is deployed in at least
two distinct yet interrelated senses: it essentially signifies both thinking and intuiting. In
the first sense it relates to our theoretical activity, in the second to our practical activity.
That the term setzen is capable of being deployed in a twofold sense in the Grundlage is
specifically highlighted by Fichte himself in the text: “In the two sentences that have just
been stated there is obviously a double sense (Doppelsinn) in the meaning of the word
‘positing’ (setzen).”26 Here Fichte’s underscoring of the “double sense” of setzen occurs in
the context of a discussion about the passive and active nature of the I, about its real and
ideal grounds. In essence, for Fichte, one becomes aware of the ideal ground through the
activity  of  thinking,  whereas  intuiting is  required for  a  consciousness  of  the real  or
practical ground. Moreover, the fact that setzen in the Grundlage had been be employed in
a twofold sense in terms of thinking and intuiting, including in relation to the object-
nature of the empirical I, is confirmed by Fichte in his 1798 System of Ethics. There he
writes: “However – a proposition that we can presuppose to be known and proved from a
Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre – the I is something only to the extent and
degree in which it posits (intuits and thinks) itself as the same, and it is nothing that it
does not posit itself to be.”27
13 The twofold philosophical sense of “positing” in the Grundlage is not unknown in the
research. In 1996 Claudio Cesa published a seminal essay precisely on Fichte’s reference
to this double meaning of setzen.28 In his article in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte, Paul
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Franks does not refer to Cesa’s seminal text, but it is cited by Christian Klotz in another
contribution.29 Cesa also points to a corresponding example of the double function of the
activity of positing in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo.30 There the context is on
the synthesis of the real and ideal activity of the I, and how it might be possible to unite
them  in  consciousness  in  an  unconditioned  or  absolute  (schlechthin)  manner:  “The
proposition, ‘the I posits itself’, thus has two inseparably linked meanings: an ideal and
real meaning, both of which are absolutely united in the I.”31 
14 In his illuminating discussion on setzen or positing in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte,
Paul Franks goes greatly beyond much of the earlier research. Although he does not cite
Fichte’s  later  reference  in  the  Grundlage to  the  word’s  “double  sense”,  he  arrives  at
exactly the same conclusion that it should be understood in this manner. Therefore, I can
only agree with him when he puts forward the view that Fichte chose this unusual term
positing because  he  needed a  single  linguistic  formulation for  capturing this  unified
notion of the human being. Franks argues that, philosophically speaking, positing is a
term which particularly well expresses the theoretical and practical rational activities of
the I itself: Fichte “needs a fundamental notion of rational agency as such. Positing is the
notion he employs. […] Furthermore, since Fichte rejects any radical distinction between
theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, positing is an activity that is capable of
both theoretical and practical inflections.”32 
15 Paul Franks also rightly points to the logical tradition of ponere in which setzen originally
arose, and shows Kant’s recourse to it in his early text of 1763: Only Possible Argument in
Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God. There Kant equates positing with being:
“The concept of position or positing is perfectly simple: it is identical with the concept of
being in general.”33 Thus, on the topic of philosophical origins too, Paul Franks’s article
provides a much more detailed and original treatment of the Kantian heritage of positing
in Fichte than all previous commentators, convincingly showing among other things how
it relates to Kant’s reflections on the question of existence, position in space, and the
issues  relating  to  the  ontological  proof  of  God.34 However,  perhaps  there  are  other
fundamental  Fichtean  links  to  Kant’s  text,  especially  in  connection  with  Fichte’s
philosophy of religion. For if Fichte’s concept of setzen or positing is indebted to Kant’s
treatment of  being and absolute positing in the Only Possible  Argument in Support  of  a
Demonstration of the Existence of God, as it definitely seems to be, then a possible avenue of
future research that could be worth exploring is how far Fichte’s references to absolute
positing and the modes of Spinoza’s God in the Grundlage35, are also a transformation or
extension of Kant’s arguments on absolute positing and Spinoza’s God in that same early
1763 text.36 
 
3. The Significance of Fichte’s Tathandlung 
16 It should be clear that with the example of setzen or ‘positing’, readers of Fichte should
bear  in  mind  the  possibility  that  his  key  philosophical  terms  might  have  multiple
meanings. And of course, even though the terms change in the different versions of the
Wissenschaftslehre, the central underlying ideas and philosophical doctrines do not change,
but  are  carried  over  into  subsequent  presentations.  This  important  principle  is
summarized by Daniel Breazeale in The Cambridge Companion to Fichte, when discussing the
Fichtean conception of Anstoß in the early Grundlage and later nova methodo: “A similar
point might also be made about the differences in technical terminology found in the two
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presentations. Thus, for example, though the term Anstoß or ‘check’ does not occur in the
second presentation, the doctrine itself is retained, though what was previously referred
to  as  a  ‘check’  upon the  activity  of  the  I  is  now called ‘a  feeling  of  the  I’s  original
limitation or determinacy’ […] The same is true for other key terms: the ‘subject/object’
of  the  second  presentation,  for  example,  is  simply  another  name  for  the  ‘f/act’  or
Tathandlung of the first presentation.”37 
17 This leads to the question: apart from setzen (positing), what about other key Fichtean
terms – do they too have an especially dual meaning or significance? As one can see from
Daniel  Breazeale’s  statement  above,  the  free  Tathandlung or  act  carried  out  by  the
transcendental philosopher relates to the I as both a subject and object, or more exactly,
as a “subject-object”.  Like with setzen,  the word Tathandlung also seems to have dual
sense, and which is directly evident in the composition of the term itself. It is made up of
the  two  German  words  Tat (deed)  and  Handlung (action).  In  the  Wissenschaftslehre, 
Tathandlung relates to the ability of the I as subject to carry out an action in which it
becomes  its  own  cognitive  object.  Fichte  repeatedly  juxtaposes  this  inner  act  with
Tatsachen – the facts or objects of external being. Again, it is not by chance that Fichte
intentionally  chose  the  term Tatsache  to  highlight  this  juxtaposition,  for  it  is  also  a
composite word formed out of two other words, Tat (deed) and Sachen (things). 
18 In the Cambridge Companion to Fichte Elizabeth Millán succinctly observes the willed and
performative aspect of this move: Fichte’s philosophy is a “bold shift from a fact (Tatsache
) of consciousness to an act of performance (Tathandlung) of consciousness uncovering a
new starting point for all philosophizing.”38 While in his rich article on “The Dynamic
Structure  of  Consciousness”,  Christian  Klotz  also  underscores  the  dual  sense  of
Tathandlung: “There are two important aspects that Fichte wants to emphasize with this
peculiar terminological move. First, the term expresses the difference between the self-
constitutive activity of the I and whatever is a fact (Tatsache) of consciousness and thus is
grounded by the I’s activity. Secondly, the term ‘Tathandlung’ also expresses the intrinsic
character of this activity: the action in the sense of acting (Handlung) immediately brings
about its result (Tat) …”39 However, the word Tathandlung is not a neologism created by
Fichte, as Christian Klotz mistakenly remarks.40 That is still a widespread misconception
in the research. Paul Franks demonstrated twenty years ago that its origin lies in the two
spheres of right and religion. During Fichte’s epoch, the term Tatsache was the one that
was actually the new compound neologism. It had been created by Spalding out of Tat and
Sache and used by him to translate the English word “matters of fact”.41 
19 Fully in line with the maxim of repeatedly modifying his terminology, the unique act that
Fichte had first called “Tathandlung” in 1794, becomes designated in 1804 by the Greek
word “Genesis”, since the earlier German word had been more difficult to grasp: “The
Wissenschaftslehre is underpinned by and testifies to an Act (Tathandlung), which I have
named in these lectures using the Greek word Genesis, since the Greek terms are often
more easily and correctly understood than the German ones.”42
 
4. Antitheses: Other Key Fichtean Terms with a
“Double Sense”
20 As we have seen, Fichte employs his philosophical language in various ways. Firstly, he
continually changes his philosophical terms to stimulate the spirit and avoid his system
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becoming too static. Inversely, Fichte often uses one and the same philosophical term like
setzen that has a number of different but interrelated meanings. A term may even have
more than two meanings. For example, in his study of Fichte’s 1795 essay on language
Jere Surber shows that willkührlich (arbitrary) is utilised in four distinctly different senses.
43 Likewise  for  Fichte’s  celebrated  notion  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung (intellectual
intuition). Daniel Breazeale has demonstrated in detail that throughout his writings the
single designation ‘intellectual intuition’ may signify for Fichte at least four different
things: i. an intellectual consciousness of freedom and the moral law; ii. “pure I-hood” or
identically, a Tathandlung; iii. a freely produced ‘fact of consciousness’; and iv. the method
of genetic construction.44 
21 So it is clearly imperative to examine the context in which any technical term appears in
Fichte’s writings in order to exactly determine the sense he has given it. Furthermore, a
closer analysis of Fichte’s own comments on his method of his philosophical language not
only  reveals  that  he  selected  and  employed  terms  with  multiple  and  interrelated
meanings, but that like with setzen, Fichte specifically uses terms that express a “double
sense”, in which the two main meanings appear at first sight to be directly opposed or
antithetical to each other. Here I will briefly list a number of other Fichtean terms that
are employed in this manner and show that this procedure is an intentional and intrinsic
aspect of Fichte’s philosophical methodology. 
22 A  classic  example  of  this  apparently  antithetical  double  sense  in  a  word  is  Fichte’s
conception of Anstoß.  In his article on the nova methodo in the Cambridge Companion to
Fichte, Daniel Breazeale points to the fact that Anstoß for Fichte may signify a “summons”,
i.e. an impetus impelling the I to a fresh and new sphere of activity. However, Anstoß is
also used by Fichte in virtually the opposite sense, that is to say, as a restriction for the I,
blocking  or  hindering  its  activity.45 Elsewhere  Breazeale  has  neatly  summarized  the
almost  antithetical  “double  sense”  of  Anstoß  in  Fichte’s  Grundlage  der  gesammten
Wissenschaftslehre.  “[This  passage  in  the  Grundlage]  encapsulates  Fichte’s  case  for  the
necessity of such an Anstoß for the very possibility of cognition at the same time that it
points to the dual role of the Anstoß as both a limit and a stimulus to the activity of the I.”46 
23 Or to take another well-known example. – Fichte scholarship has again long noted that
Fichte  likewise  employs  “Bestimmung”  in  two  diametrical  senses.  In  the  Cambridge
Companion to Fichte, Christian Klotz provides an important outline of Fichte’s conception
of  Wechselbestimmung (mutual  determination):  “It  is  through  the  opposed  directions
involved in the mutual determinations of the I and not-I in the dynamical sense that
Fichte  can  introduce  –  albeit  in  an  initial  and  rudimentary  sense  –  the  distinction
between the ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ aspects of consciousness.”47 However, it is worth
remarking that this oppositional nature is even present in the single term Bestimmung. On
the  one  hand,  Fichte’s  concept  of  a  Bestimmung is  that  of  a  “determination”,  i.e.
determining,  measuring or defining some kind of object or activity (and here we see
further explicit links to setzen and Anstoß); and on the other hand, it is like a distant ideal,
related to one’s human vocation. Günter Zöller perfectly summarizes this duality present
in Fichte’s 1800 book Die Bestimmung des Menschen: “The key word of the work’s German
title ‘Bestimmung’, can mean both ‘determination’, in the sense of an imposed limitation,
and ‘calling’ or ‘vocation’, indicating the goal of some pursuit. Fichte’s employment of the
term in its finitist-finalist double meaning addresses the tension between what is fixed or
given in human existence and what is open and yet to be realized about it.”48 
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24 A third example is Fichte’s enigmatic use of the old German word “Gesicht” in his Berlin
period,  a  term  which  literally  means  “face”.  In  his  article  “Fichte’s  Philosophy  of
Religion” in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte, Hansjürgen Verweyen explains how Gesicht
signifies for Fichte both a philosophical “idea” as well as a “spiritual revelation”.49 Hence,
this  too appears to be a striking contradiction.  No doubt most  other thinkers would
thoroughly distinguish between the revelations or visions of a religious mystic and the
strictly deducted ideas of a philosopher. Yet in works such as the 1807/08 Reden an die
deutsche  Nation and  the  1811/12  Vorlesungen  über  die  Bestimmung  des  Gelehrten,  Fichte
apparently sees no contradiction, clearly believing that the two senses of Gesicht may
ultimately be reconciled. In these two late Berlin texts he employs one and the same word
Gesicht for the visions of the Old Testament prophet Ezekiel on the one hand, and for the
scientific ideas of the scholar of the Wissenschaftslehre on the other.50 
25 How could these two senses of Gesicht be rationally and epistemologically reconciled? One
possible path to examine would be to take Fichte’s conception of Anschauen or intellectual
intuiting as a cognitive form of “seeing”, and then relate it back to the original Platonic
Greek sense of “idea”, which as we saw is explicitly translated into German by Fichte as
Gesicht. In the domain of his philosophy of religion, Fichte designated Plato as one of the
philosophical forerunners to the Wissenschaftslehre.51 Günter Zöller remarks in his article
“Fichte’s Later Presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre” on Fichte’s Bildlehre, or theory of
the  image,  are  highly  appropriate  in  this  regard:  “Fichte’s  imagist  understanding  of
knowledge further strengthens the linkage of his thought to Plato, whose key concept of
Form (or Idea) is etymologically derived from the Greek word for ‘seeing’. Like Plato,
Fichte  tends  to  cast  his  conception  of  knowledge  in  visual  terms  by  assimilating
knowledge to seeing and by designating the instantaneous obtaining of knowledge as
‘intuition’ and ‘insight’.”52 
 
5. Conclusion: Language in the Light of the Synthetic
Method
26 In the Preface to the Grundlage Fichte states: “I especially consider it necessary to recall
that I will not say everything, but I will also leave some things for my readers to think
about.”53 Looked at in isolation, Fichte’s employment of the above-mentioned main terms
of setzen, Tathandlung, Bestimmung, Anstoß and Gesicht may appear unusual, and perhaps
not particularly methodical. It is only when we consider them as a totality that a pattern
and systematicity starts to arise. Could Fichte have intentionally and systematically used
terms with almost antithetical senses – where it is left to the reader to carefully examine
the context, and to actively try and overcome their apparent contradictions? It appears
so,  especially if  we view Fichte’s  linguistic method as an integral  part of  his  general
synthetic method of philosophy, and not divorced from it, as is so often the case. 
27 Fichte’s  synthetic  method  involves  the  positing  of  opposed  elements  and  then
undertaking a process which involves trying to overcome the antitheses. This process
involves the power of the imagination, which in Fichte’s system assists the I in uniting the
apparently contradictory elements. Fichte’s philosophical method is often known by the
triad of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis”,  as Christian Klotz explains in his contribution.54
Klotz is also one of the few contributors in the Cambridge Companion to Fichte to highlight
the  crucial  reconciling  function  that  the  power  of  the  imagination  plays  in  the
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Wissenschaftslehre.55 Moreover,  Daniel  Breazeale’s  article  also  provides  an overview of
Fichte’s various methodical approaches in his Jena period. Breazeale notes how Fichte’s
method in the Grundlage specifically relates to what we have said above concerning the
activity of setzen and the other key Fichtean notions and terms. It is a procedure of trying
to reconcile the conflicts between the real and ideal activities of the I: “The Foundation
begins  with  a  posited  contradiction  between the  I  and  the  not-I  and  then  proceeds
‘inward’,  as  it  were,  first  redefining  the  conflict  between  the  ‘directions’  of  the  I’s
activities or between the ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ activities of the I, and finally locating it within
the necessary internal structure of I-hood itself.”56 
28 At the non-empirical and transcendental standpoint, the task of the philosopher is to
unite  these  opposed  elements  at  a  higher  level  by  means  of  a  synthesis.  To  do  this
properly,  however,  the philosopher must not neglect to freely engage their power of
imagination. For it is the latter power which allows the philosopher to hover between the
two extremes of the finite and the infinite, the ideal and the real, the theoretical and
practical, and then to commence the process of overcoming any apparent philosophical
contradiction.  –  And not only that:  it  is  precisely the power of  the imagination that
furthermore permits the student and reader of Fichte to pass from the fixed outer letter
to the dynamic inner philosophical spirit or ideas of his system. As Fichte writes in the
Grundlage: 
“The Wissenschaftslehre is of such a kind that it cannot at all be communicated by
the mere letter, but solely by the spirit. This is because in anyone who studies it, its
foundational ideas have to be generated by the creative power of the imagination
itself.”57 
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